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2Non Technical Summary
A rapid increase in credit in an economy is now commonly perceived to be one of the leading
indicators of ﬁnancial instability. In the aftermath of the recent crisis, a key policy response
has been to focus on the ratio of private sector credit (PSC) to GDP. In particular, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed that banks hold additional capital
at times when the ratio of private sector credit to GDP deviates from its long run trend.
This paper examines the relationship between PSC and credit in the case of Ireland, a
country which, even by international standards, experienced a rapid accumulation of credit
in the years preceding the current crisis.
In examining the Basel proposal, this paper makes two contributions. First, instead of
using deviations from a long run trend to indicate periods of excessive credit growth, the
paper identiﬁes a period when the relationship between credit and GDP was stable, thus
allowing one to estimate the steady-state relationship. Estimating a capital buﬀer based
on deviations from this steady state relationship, particularly for countries that have expe-
rienced a rapid build up of credit, may be a more accurate calibration of a countercyclical
buﬀer. While Irish credit growth increased markedly over the past 10 years, it is worth not-
ing that other European countries also experienced signiﬁcant increases. Indeed the paper
notes the emergence of a “twin club” development across Europe in that regard. Thus, we
feel the notion of alternative states in the PSC to GDP ratio needs to be allowed for in
applying the Basel proposal across countries.
Second, the paper develops a counterfactual scenario, in which PSC in the Irish economy
grew at the European average rather than the rapid rate experienced prior to the crisis.
Generally speaking, the build-up in credit prior to the crisis would imply that the banking
sector must deleverage over the coming years, impacting negatively on economic growth.
Our counterfactual scenario indicates that by 2007 GDP in the Irish economy was over 20
per cent higher than what would have prevailed if a more normal rate of credit growth had
been experienced. However, the scenario also suggests that by 2010 GDP had fallen below
the level suggested by a more equilibrium level of credit within the economy. Thus, going
forward, these results would suggest two countervailing implications for Irish growth: whilethe deleveraging process could cause a drag on economic growth as credit levels are set
to contract in the real economy, the overcorrection implied by the counterfactual scenario
suggests that growth rates could accelerate in the short to medium term.
41 Introduction
As a result of the established link between credit booms and ﬁnancial crises, excessive credit
growth is now generally considered a reliable ‘early warning indicator’. Traditionally, for
most western countries, the amount of credit provision in an economy was directly related
to the level of deposits within the ﬁnancial system. However, over the past 10 to 15 years,
ﬁnancial innovation saw the link between credit and deposits broken with the consequent
result of a general increase in credit provision. This sizeable build-up of credit has been
identiﬁed by many as being one of the main contributing factors to the ﬁnancial crisis, which
orginated in mid 2007. As a result, greater attention is now focussing on determining what
the steady-state level of credit should be for an economy and benchmarking this against the
actual levels which pertain at a point in time.
From a macro prudential perspective, the ratio of private-sector credit to GDP has
become an increasingly popular benchmark of the sustainable levels of credit. Most recently,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)1 has issued a proposal to incorporate
this approach into the regulatory system, by using the deviation from long-run trend of the
PSC/GDP ratio (the ‘credit gap’) to calibrate a countercyclical capital buﬀer. In the ﬁrst
instance, this method uses the ratio of credit to GDP, thus allowing credit to grow naturally
in line with overall economic activity. Trending techniques are then employed to generate
a long-run mean for the ratio and the actual position is then contrasted with this mean.
In this paper we examine, in a rigorous manner, the nature of the credit to GDP relation-
ship in an Irish case. Ireland, in many regards, represents the classic example of a country
where a rapid and sustained accumulation of private sector credit resulted in deep ﬁnancial
instability. Since the mid-1990s, the Irish economy experienced profound economic change,
having, in the 1980s, witnessed negligible economic growth, an average unemployment rate
of 15 per cent and high levels of personal taxation. The emergence of the so-called Celtic
Tiger in the mid-1990s led to a sustained period of economic growth. Between 1995 and
2007, the size of the economy doubled with the total number of people employed in the
country increasing by approximately 64 per cent. This sustained increase in income levels
1See also, Drehmann et al (2010)
5was coupled with a stable, low interest rate environment. At the same time, a consider-
able degree of ﬁnancial liberalisation was taking place in the Irish credit market. Almost
inevitably, a housing boom occurred, which, in terms of price increases and relative activity
levels, was probably the largest across OECD countries for the period 1995 - 2008. The
sharp contraction in the Irish property sector post-2008 has also been amongst the most
signiﬁcant in the western world with ensuing diﬃculties for the Irish ﬁnancial sector.
In examining the ratio of Irish credit to GDP, we determine the presence of a number
of diﬀerent states in the relationship between these variables over the period 1982 - 2010.
Based on this analysis, we determine the steady-state relationship between credit and GDP
in the Irish economy and then perform scenario analysis to see what would have happened
to Irish GDP between 1998 and 2010, if credit had evolved in a manner similiar to other
European countries for that period.
In examining the Irish case, we think the results we obtain have a number of interesting
policy implications. Firstly, they call into question the use of simple private sector credit to
GDP ratios for countries who have experienced signiﬁcant credit increases over the past 10
years. As we will see, while the Irish case may be somewhat extreme in terms of the growth
of credit, it was by no means the exception in an European context. Indeed, it would appear
that there has been an emergence of two clubs across European countries in terms of the
growth rate of the PSC to GDP ratio. In modelling a relationship between credit and GDP,
our results also suggest a somewhat uncertain path for future Irish GDP growth. Given
the very high rate of the Irish funding gap at present, it is almost inevitable that a rather
sustained period of deleveraging will be experienced by the Irish ﬁnancial system. This will
more than likely exercise a drag on the pace of Irish economic growth in the medium term.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; in the next section the relationship of
credit and GDP is discussed in a broad policy context. The role of ﬁnancial liberalisation
in an Irish context is then examined. In particular we focus on the residential property
market. An empirical section examines the issue of a structural break in the Irish ratio and
a subsequent section presents a model of credit and GDP with a counterfactual simulation.
A ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding comments.
62 Credit to GDP and the policy environment
2.1 The role of credit in crises
The incidence of high credit growth in advance of ﬁnancial crises has been recognised for
some time. Numerous case studies have pointed to the incidence of high credit growth be-
fore crises (see, for example, Kaminsky’s (1999) discussion of the Asian and Latin American
crises in 1990s). In the empirical literature, there is signiﬁcant evidence of a link between
rapid credit growth increasing defaults. For instance, Dell’Ariccia and Marques (2006) pre-
dict that episodes of future defaults are more likely in the aftermath of periods of strong
credit expansion. Segoviano Basurto et al (2006) show that credit to GDP is a good predic-
tor of future defaults, while Clair (1992), Keeton (1999) and Salas and Saurina (2002) all
link rapid credit growth with loan losses. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) ﬁnd a direct, lagged
relationship between credit cycles and credit risk.
Generally, this link between rapid credit growth and increasing defaults is linked to
over-exuberant lending in the upswing of a cycle. During an upswing, the risk associated
with loans may become underestimated. It has long been shown that there is an empirical
link between GDP and credit growth. Additionally, there is evidence that banks’ lending
mistakes are more prevalent in economic booms (when GDP is increasing) than in recessions.
There are a number of channels through which this link between rapid credit growth and
increasing defaults may operate.
Asset prices play a key role in this. From a demand perspective, on the upswing of
a business cycle, increasing asset prices increase the value of (property) collateral against
which households and corporates can borrow. In addition, increases in other asset classes
can increase the net worth of borrowers. From the supply-side point of view, taking a
stylised balance sheet in which assets equal liabilities and equity, an increase in asset prices
will push up the value of equity enabling a bank to expand the asset side of its balance sheet
by increasing lending (see, for instance, Adrian and Shin (2008)). The role of securitisation
is also important in this process. For instance, the ability to move assets oﬀ balance sheet
in such a situation allows banks to continue to expand the asset side of their balance sheet
without a concurrent increase in liabilities.
7A number of potential channels through which lending standards may decline in an
upswing have also been put forward.2 For instance, the traditional principal-agent problem
may apply to the relationship between bank managers and shareholders. As shareholders
have imperfect information, once the bank manager attains a rate of return which satisﬁes
the shareholders, he may pursue objectives (for instance a growth objective) other than those
which maximise the ﬁrm’s value. Herd mentality (Rajan (1994)) relates to the requirement
for managers to compete with others in the market. Credit mistakes are judged more
leniently if they are common to the whole industry, while managers are likely to be punished
by shareholders if they continually lose market share. As such, if competitors are pursuing
market share objectives, it is in the interests of the individual bank manager to follow suit.
The institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell (2004)) posits that over-time banks
weight less the experience of the last crisis. As crises generally happen irregularly, the longer
the time period since the last crisis, the fewer staﬀ there are who recall that experience.
For staﬀ that still remember the last crisis, there is the ‘this time it’s diﬀerent’ problem.
Finally, ﬁnancial liberalisation, and the associated reduction in reserve requirements, and
expansion of international ﬂows of cheap money is another important means through which
credit may expand.3
All the above factors may lead to a decline in the creditworthiness of borrowers which will
increase the vulnerability of banks’ loan portfolios to a shock to asset quality. When such a
shock occurs, depositors (traditionally retail, but more recently, wholesale depositors) must
reassess their investment in the bank, leading to funding liquidity pressures, and ultimately,
insolvency, for those banks that are aﬀected.
2.2 Credit as an early warning indicator
As a result of the established link between credit booms and ﬁnancial crisis, excessive
credit growth is now generally considered a reliable ‘early warning indicator’. The issue in
2For a more detailed discussion of the literature, see Saurina and Jimenez (2006).
3Pill and Pradhan (1995) ﬁnd that the ratio of private-sector credit to GDP best captures ﬁnancial
liberalisation, while Demirguc-Kunt and Detrgiache (1998) ﬁnd limited evidence of the predictive power of
this ratio of ﬁnancial crises, when used as a proxy for ﬁnancial liberalisation).
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on economic fundamentals, and credit growth that may be deemed ‘excessive’.
A number of diﬀerent approaches have been taken to estimate this in the literature.
Perhaps the most predominant method, in many respects, is the signalling approach, which
is used in Kaminsky (1999), Borio and Lowe (2002), Hilbers et al (2005), Borio and Drehman
(2009) and Alessi and Detken (2009). Most recently, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2010)4 has issued a proposal to hard wire this approach into the regulatory
system, by using the deviation from long-run trend of the PSC/GDP ratio (the ‘credit gap’)
to calibrate a countercyclical capital buﬀer. In the ﬁrst instance, this method uses the ratio
of credit to GDP, thus allowing credit to grow naturally in line with overall economic
activity. The series is then de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter, and a threshold
level is then set, which weights in some way the relevant importance of type I (failing to
give a signal when a crisis occurs) and type II errors (giving a positive signal when no crisis
happens).5
There are a number of drawbacks associated with the hodrick-prescott approach. First,
the HP ﬁlter ﬁts a trend through all the observations of real GDP, regardless of any struc-
tural breaks that may have occurred. Such structural breaks could easily occur in long-run
data. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1998) among others, show that credit growth is
stronger in developed economies than in less-developed economies. As such, many emerg-
ing economies can experience rapid increases in credit related to a ‘catch-up’ process as the
economy becomes more ﬁnancially sophisticated. Such increases could be appropriate and
indeed necessary for the development of an economy, but could trigger a signal using the
HP ﬁlter.
HP ﬁlters are also sensitive to end-point bias, as the trend line is ﬁtted symmetrically
through the data. If the beginning and the end of the data set do not reﬂect similar points
in the cycle, then the trend will be biased upwards or downwards depending on the actual
4See also, Drehmann et al (2010)
5Probably the most popular method is to minimise the noise-to-signal ratio; however, other methods can
be used: Borio and Drehman (2009) examine two alternative approaches: minimise the weighted sum of type
I and type II errors given weights of alpha and one minus alpha for type I and type II errors, respectively;
and minimise the noise-to-signal ratio subject to predicting some minimum percentage of crises.
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may be reduced using ARIMA forecasts. In addition, HP ﬁlters are also sensitive to a time
length selection; results from rolling HP ﬁlters may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from ex-post trend
estimation (see Gourichas et al (2001)). Further, in the speciﬁc case of the PSC/GDP ratio,
if GDP declines, but credit remains constant, a boom can be detected.
Finally, the outcome from a HP ﬁlter is sensitive to the smoothing parameter used. For
instance, Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio and Drehman (2009) use a lambda of 1600, the
typical smoothing parameter for a business cycle. The BCBS use a smoothing parameter
of 400,000, thus assuming that the credit cycle is 3-4 times the length of the business cycle.
Figure 1 documents the gap between realised and trend for the Irish PSC/Credit ratio,with
the trend estimated from a HP ﬁlter across a selection of lamda values. It is clearly evident
that this change in smoothing parameters has a signiﬁcant impact on the volatility of the de-
trended series. Drehman et al (2010) show these ﬁndings are repeated at the international
level.
Other methods have also been used to estimate the equilibrium level of credit. While
a number of models have examined the determinants of credit demand or credit supply
separately, modelling and estimation techniques in this area are complicated by the diﬃculty
of disentangling supply- and demand-side eﬀects. Hofmann (2001) uses a cointegrating VAR
model on an individual basis for 16 industrialised countries. The ﬁndings are interpreted
as long-run extended credit-demand relationships, although some credit-supply eﬀects may
also be captured. An error correction model is used to analyse dynamic interactions by
computing orthogonal impulse responses. Eller et al (2010) estimate the long-run (demand-
side) and short-run (supply side) determinants of private sector credit developments, ﬁrst
identifying structural breaks in the data, then estimating a cointegrating VAR for a panel
dataset, and then modelling short-run dynamics as an markov-switching error correction
model allowing coeﬃcients to vary in diﬀerent unobservable states. Egert et al (2006)
use an out-of-sample panel model to estimate the equilibrium level of credit in transition
economies. Arguing that in-sample estimates are biased due to low initial levels of credit in
what were once centralised economies, and because equation estimates for these economies
are unstable, the authors use small open developed economies to benchmark equilibrium
10credit in transition economies.
The growing literature on DSGE models also includes some estimation of equilibrium
levels of credit. For instance, using Baysian techniques, Gerali et al (2010) estimate a
model in which impatient corporates and households demand loans supplied by imperfectly
competitive banks using both deposits and capital (which is accumulated from reinvested
earnings). Margins charged on loans depend on elasticities of loan and deposit demand,
interest rate stickiness and banks’ capital-to-assets ratio. Banks’ balance sheet constraints
establish a link with the business cycle, which aﬀects proﬁts and capital, and therefore the
supply of credit.
3 Property prices and ﬁnancial liberalisation - the case of
Ireland
Since the early part of the present decade, the Irish economy and the property market, in
particular, present classic examples of excessive credit growth. Rapid expansion in private
sector credit went hand in hand with a surge in both house prices and activity levels. In
this section we brieﬂy outline some of the changes in credit provision in the Irish banking
sector and the impact this has had on the residential mortgage market.
The signiﬁcant increase in the availability of mortgage credit in an Irish context can
be observed in Table 1. The total value of mortgages issued increased threefold between
2000 and 2005. The total number of new mortgages went from just under 50,000 in 1995,
to 80,000 in 2000 and to over 120,000 mortgages by 2005. The average size of a mortgage
also increased considerably over the period. In 1995 the average mortgage extended by
an Irish credit institution was 54,094 euros, by 2005, this had climbed to 231,206 euros.
Inevitably with such an expansion in credit, house prices increased substantially over the
period. Between 2000 and 2007, prices rose by almost 65 per cent. The peak in house
prices occurred in 2007 quarter two and since then the residential market has witnessed a
substantial decline in activity as both housing supply and prices have fallen considerably.
This surge of increased credit availability came after a period of considerable ﬁnancial
deregulation and liberalisation in the Irish market. The mid to late 1980s and the 1990s saw
11the ending of the formal guidelines on bank lending to the private sector and the indicative
guidelines on the sectoral allocation of credit by banks; the introduction of new interest-
rate arrangements in 1985; a major relaxation of exchange controls in 1988 with a further
relaxation in 1992. The primary liquidity ratio was also subject to liberalising measures
as it was reduced four times from a level of 10 per cent in 1991 to 2 per cent in 1999,
in conformity with the requirements of the new operational framework of the Eurosystem.
The removal of credit and interest-rate controls would have given banks more freedom in
determining the level and allocation of credit that they would like to supply. Furthermore,
the removal of exchange-rate controls would have increased banks’ ability to attract deposits
from non-residents.
Another seminal inﬂuence has been monetary union in Europe, which was quickly fol-
lowed by the full integration of the euro area money market. A further feature of the lib-
eralisation of the loan market was the cessation of Central Bank guidelines on the sectoral
allocation of credit. This is highly relevant in the context of residential lending patterns
as the Bank had consistently favoured the supply of credit to so-called productive enter-
prises and accordingly had discouraged its supply to the property market, which it had not
perceived as being productive.
Traditionally, credit institutions’ total domestic deposit liabilities has been the main
funding source for credit supply in the Irish market. However, an additional source of fund-
ing available over the past 10 years has been cross-border funding in the form of interbank
borrowing and debt issuance. Such a source of funding was negligible before the mid-1990s
but has grown exponentially since then. Both the timing of its emergence and its subse-
quent rate of growth would suggest that the funding rate has had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on domestic economic activity and particularly that in the mortgage and housing markets.
This issue is commented on in more detail in Section 4 below. An exact chronology of
the control and subsequent liberalisation of the Irish credit market is discussed in detail in
Kelly and Everett (2004). See, in particular, Box 1 pgs 96 and 97, which illustrates the
building and dismantling of controls over the period 1973 to 1999. Although many of these
liberalising measures took place a long time ago, up to 20 years ago in some cases, their
full eﬀects may have taken some time to fully materialise. The relationship between house
12prices and greater availability of mortgage credit is examined in some detail in an Irish
context by Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007). Using a variety of econometric techniques,
they found a mutually reinforcing relationship between house prices and mortgage credit.
In a related piece, Addison-Smyth, McQuinn and O’Reilly (2009) clearly demonstrate that
the emergence and substantial increase in the ability of domestic banks to source funds from
abroad had a signiﬁcant impact on house prices post-2003.
4 Empirical examination
Our primary focus is on the relationship between GDP and private-sector credit (PSC) in
the Irish economy over the period 1982 - 2010.6 In Table 2 a summary of the data for
certain sub-periods is presented. In Figure 1 we plot the real annual growth rates of GDP
and PSC over the period. What is evident is that for much of the sample, the growth rates
would appear to be highly correlated suggesting the possiblity of a long-run equilibrium
relationship. However, for certain sub-periods it is apparent that any such relationship
between the variables breaks down. From 1997 to 2001 and from 2003 to 2009 it is obvious
that annual growth rates of PSC considerably exceeded that of GDP. This can be seen from
Figure 2, which plots the ratio of PSC to GDP i.e., ﬁnancial deepening. While the ratio
is relatively stable between 1982 and 1997, thereafter, the growth rate would appear to
experience two sharp increases. Particularly, from 2003 onwards, this period of PSC growth
was funded primarily through cross-border funding in the form of interbank borrowing and
debt issuance. Traditionally, in the Irish economy, a relatively stable relationship existed
between PSC and retail deposits. However, the extent to which this relationship broke down
can be gleaned from Figure 3. This plots both the actual level of credit and deposits in
the left panel and the percentage diﬀerence (or funding gap) on the right. The scale of this
funding gap suggests that in the absence of a signiﬁcant increase in future deposit levels,
the Irish banking system is facing into a period of considerable deleveraging with knock on
implications for the real economy.
While the build-up of credit in the Irish circumstance has been somewhat extreme, the
61982 is the earliest date that data for PSC is available.
13last 10 years has seen many European countries also experience signiﬁcant increases. Figure
4 plots the degree of ﬁnancial deepening for a sample of European countries from 1999 to
the present. What is evident is the emergence of two clubs for this sample of countries.
On the left hand side of the ﬁgure, the ratio is plotted for Ireland, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, while the remaining seven countries (Germany, France,
Italy, Finland, Greece, Belgium and Austria) are plotted on the right. For the former set
of countries, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP is around 200 per cent by 2010. This
follows a period of sustained growth in the ratio, mainly from about 2003 onwards. While
some countries in the latter category also experience growth, most of these countries have
a ratio of approximately 100 per cent by 2010.
4.1 Structural break analysis
Earlier sections outline the shortcoming of basing new counter-cyclical capital requirements
on HP ﬁlter techniques and argue targeting a steady state level would be more eﬃcient.
The problem is determining periods when the PSC/GDP ratio is at steady state level and
periods of deviation. In a formal, statistical manner, the possibility of multiple states in a
relationship can be explored using a Markov Switching framework.
A regime-switching model combines two or more sets of parameters into one system and
also the likelihood of each regime at a given time. We deﬁne a two state7 Markov-switching










α1 s(t) = 1
α2 s(t) = 2
where s(t) denotes the state the economy is in at time t. s(t) is determined by a
Markov chain which itself depends on a transition matrix. The transition matrix gathers
the probabilities that one particular state is followed by another particular state. These
transition probabilities are assumed to be time stationary.
7The regime classiﬁcation measure (RCM) of Ang and Bekaert (2002) indicates that both regimes are
clearly deﬁned.
14Table 3 shows the growth rate of the PSC/GDP ratio moves discretely between two
regimes; one characterised by a stable ratio oscillating around zero growth (state 1) and
another deﬁned as highly positive and more volatile (state 2). In fact, estimates show
annualised quarterly growth of more than 12 per cent for state 2. This results in a credit
boom any time the economy is in state 2. The model is well deﬁned as the transition
probabilities show the level of persistence in each regime is quite high indicating that when
the economy is in a particular regime in one period, it is highly likely to remain in that
state in the next time period.
Figure 6 presents the time series dimension, showing a high and consistent probability
of being in state 1 for the period 1983-1997. The model then estimates a switch, with
PSC outpacing GDP until 2001 when a US recession stiﬂed the Irish credit boom. In 2003,
another switch occurs with PSC again outpacing GDP until the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008.
This provides solid justiﬁcation for estimating the steady-state relationship over the period
1983-1997.
4.2 Empirical model
The results from the Markov switching regime approach are used to motivate the econo-
metric analysis. In particular, these results suggest the presence of a clear structural break
in the PSC to GDP relationship around 1998. In Table 3 we present the results of Granger
causality tests for the period 1983 to 1997. Standard F-Tests would suggest that, in the
long-run, credit appears to be a determinant of both itself and GDP, while GDP would only
appear to be a determinant of itself. This is not an altogether surprising result given the
manner in which credit was regulated in the Irish economy.
Based on this, we run a series of long-run regressions with GDP as the dependent
variable and PSC as the regressor. Given the results from the structural break analysis, we
conduct the estimation over the entire (1982 - 2010) period and over the sub-period 1982 -
1997. The results are summarised in Table 4.
In the interests of robustness, we use two long-run estimators. Along with OLS esti-
mates, we also use the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) methodology of Stock and
Watson (1993). The DOLS estimator falls under the single-equation Engle Granger (Engle
15and Granger (1987)) approach to cointegration while allowing for endogeneity within the
speciﬁed long-run relationships. Single equation approaches have been used in other models
of the housing market, such as Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), Fitzpatrick and McQuinn
(2007), McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007) and McQuinn and O’Reilly (2008).
The Stock and Watson (1993) DOLS approach explicitly allows for potential correlation
between explanatory variables and the error process. It involves adding both leads and
lags of the diﬀerenced regressors to the hypothesised long-run speciﬁcation to correct for
correlation between the error process.8 In our application, the error term is assumed to
follow an AR(2) process, while the number of leads and lags is set equal to 2.9
The results clearly demonstrate a signiﬁcant relationship between the variables. With
both OLS and DOLS, the private sector variable is highly signiﬁcant. Clearly, over the
period 1982 - 1997, the coeﬃcient on the PSC variable is somewhat greater than what it
is when estimated over the entire period. As GDP doesn’t grow at the same rate as PSC
after 1998, the size of the coeﬃcient on the PSC variable is, consequently, smaller for this
period. Figure 4 plots the OLS residuals from the regression over the two sample periods.
In comparison with the residuals estimated over the entire sample period, those estimated
over the period 1982 - 1997 appear to be well-behaved and stationary.
4.3 Counterfactual scenario
Based on the long-run model estimated for GDP over the period 1983 - 1997, we also
estimate the equivalent short-run model for both GDP and private-sector credit. For the
error-correction term, we use the residuals from the OLS regression of GDP on PSC. The
results are summarised in Table 5 and it is evident, in the case of GDP, that the error
correction term is negative and signiﬁcant. Both short-term models have relatively high
8The error term is liable to be serially correlated so the covariance matrix of the estimated coeﬃcients
must be adjusted accordingly. This involves modifying the covariance matrix of the original regressors by
specifying and estimating an AR(p) model for the error term. See Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007) for more
on this.
9We experimented with alternative values of k and length of the AR() process, however, our results were
not signiﬁcantly changed. Parameter estimates for the leads and lags in the DOLS estimation are available,
upon request, from the authors.
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We then use the short-run model for GDP to perform a counterfactual simulation. The
question we ask is what would have happened to Irish GDP, post 1997, if credit in the
economy had grown at the European average? In conducting the simulation, we use the
results for the error correction model presented in Table 5. Thus, given the moderate rate
of credit growth assumed under the simulation, we are also assuming that the economy
responds in a steady-state like manner to this growth. In Figure 6 we contrast the actual
rate of credit growth with the average across the countries in Figure 5. In Figure 7 we
then plot the actual level of GDP with the simulated level from the short-run model. The
percentage diﬀerence between the two levels is also plotted. By 2007, it is evident that actual
GDP in the Irish economy, was over 20 per cent higher than what would have prevailed if
a more normal rate of credit growth had been experienced. One issue which does emerge
from the simulation is that by 2010, the Irish economy would appear to have over corrected
in terms of the long-run relationship between credit and GDP i.e. GDP has fallen below
the level suggested by a more equilibrium level of credit within the economy.
Thus, going forward, these results would suggest two countervailing implications for
Irish growth. The deleveraging process suggested by the large funding gap in Figure 3
would likely cause a drag on economic growth as credit levels are set to contract in the real
economy. However the overcorrection, which appears to have occurred already, could cause
growth rates to accelerate in the short to medium term.
This contractionary impact of private-sector credit on GDP has recently been the focus of
some interest. In a cross-country context, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) examine whether
the signiﬁcant build up in the ratio of credit to GDP prior to 2007 impacted negatively
on the growth rate of GDP post 2008. Connor and O’Kelly (2010), in a counter-factual
exercise, estimate the eﬀect on Irish GDP between 2003 and 2008 if a stricter ﬁnancial
system regulatory regime had been in place during this period. The greater regulatory
controls are simulated through lower levels of private-sector credit levels due to reduced
activity levels in the Irish residential and commercial property market.
175 Conclusions
A wealth of literature now links rapid credit growth with ﬁnancial crises. Empirically, this
has prompted a number of attempts to exploit data on credit growth to build early warning
indicators of ﬁnancial crises. From a policy perspective, the most recent example of this
has been the proposed countercyclical capital buﬀer proposed by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. The proposal is to calibrate this buﬀer based on the deviation from
trend (as calculated using a HP ﬁlter) of the PSC/GDP ratio.
We examine the use of such an approach in an Irish context. Even by international
standards, post-2003, the accumulation of credit in the Irish economy has been considerable.
The most obvious manifestation of this credit boom was through the residential housing
market, where increases in Irish house prices were the largest over the last 10 years across
OECD countries.
In examining the Basel proposal, the paper makes two contributions. First, it provides
an alternative to the HP ﬁlter trending techniques by using a Markov switching framework.
This determines periods of stability in the PSC to GDP ratio, thus allowing one to estimate
the steady state relationship. A capital buﬀer to prevent excess credit can be based on
deviations from this estimate. This would seem to be particularly warranted where a country
experienced a rapid build up of credit. While Irish credit growth increased markedly over the
past 10 years, it is worth noting that other European countries also experienced signiﬁcant
increases. Indeed the paper notes the emergence of a “twin club” development across Europe
in that regard. Thus, we feel the notion of alternative states in the PSC to GDP ratio needs
to be allowed for in applying the Basel proposal across countries.
Additionally, the paper highlights the uncertain path of future Irish macroeconomic
growth given the inevitable deleveraging process, which is set to occur in the Irish banking
sector. The accumulation of credit lead to a sizeable funding gap, which will almost certainly
have to contract in the medium term. In the absence of policies tailoured to deal with this,
it is diﬃcult to envisage how this contraction will not negatively impact on future Irish
growth.
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20Table 1: Summary Irish Residential Mortgage Market Statistics
Variable Unit 1985 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009
Outstanding Level of euros
Residential Lending million 6,470 11,938 32,546 98,956 139,842 147,623
Total Value of euros
Mortgages Issued million 880 2,666 9,004 27,753 24,064 6,431
Average Mortgage Issued euros 28,192 54,094 111,355 231,206 271,154 230,309
Total Number of
Mortgages Issued 31,203 49,288 80,856 120,037 88,747 27,922
House Prices euros 46,542 77,994 169,191 276,221 322,634 242,033
Housing Supply 23,948 30,575 49,812 80,957 78,027 27,142
21Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Irish Macroeconomic Variables %
1983:4- 1983:4- 1998:1- 2003:1- 2007:2-
Series 2010:1 1997:4 2010:1 2010:1 2010:1
GDP 4.2 4.6 8.6 0.6 -4.7
Private Sector
Credit (PSC) 9.5 6.1 16.1 11.7 5.6
Financial
Deepening 98.2 61.4 97.0 171.4 219.2
Inﬂation 3.4 3.9 3.6 2.1 0.6
Funding Gap 28.6 11.6 29.1 61.6 77.1
Note: The ﬁgures for GDP and PSC are real annualised growth rates, while the rest of the variables
are actual rates.








Expected Duration (time periods)
1 29.38
2 13.66
Note:P-values are in parenthesis.

































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The cointegration test refers to the Engle-Granger (1987)
test and the statistic is the t-stat on the lagged residual term from the long-run regression run over
the 1982:4 - 1997:4 time period.
25Table 6: Short-Run Estimates of GDP and PSC 1983:1-1997:4












Note: ECT = error correction term, t-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Figure 5
Select European Countries Levels of Finanical Deepening (1999−2010)
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Figure 8
Scenario Results for Counterfactual Private Sector Credit
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